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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-2166 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
            
v. 
 
LUIS FERNANDEZ RUIZ-HERRERA, 
                                           Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 10-CR-06-00537-3) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond  
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 
October 1, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion Filed: November 6, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Luis Fernandez Ruiz-Herrera (“Ruiz-Herrera” or “Appellant”) appeals his 
sentence of 360 months for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine 
and for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 
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U.S.C. § 846, and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), respectively.  He argues that the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania violated Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), by classifying him as a “manager ” of a criminal 
conspiracy pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), which subjected him to a three-level 
enhancement and made him ineligible for a two-level downward departure under the 
safety valve provision of the sentencing guidelines.  We disagree, and thus affirm.    
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  Ruiz-Herrera participated in two separate attempts to deliver cocaine, one from 
Laredo, Texas to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and another from California to Detroit, 
Michigan.  The first incident began in May 2005 when a confidential informant  
(“Informant”) met with Ruiz-Herrera, Paul King’s (“King”) co-defendant, to set up a 
delivery of cocaine to King in Philadelphia.  Subsequently, Ruiz-Herrera provided the 
Informant with the number for a contact in Laredo, Texas (“Contact”) and directed him to 
speak with the contact about transporting a load of cocaine from Texas to Philadelphia.  
Ruiz-Herrera also provided the Informant with instructions for the delivery of the 
cocaine.   
With the information provided by Ruiz-Herrera, the Informant called the Contact 
and arranged for pick-up of the shipment destined for Philadelphia.  Thereafter, on June 
28, 2005, the Informant delivered approximately 90 kilograms of cocaine to a lot owned 
by King in Philadelphia.  Subsequently, King arrived at the lot and oversaw the removal 
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of the cocaine from pipes in the Informant’s tractor-trailer to a white van.  The DEA 
executed a search warrant for the van and found 89.93 kilograms of cocaine.      
In the second incident, Ruiz-Herrera conspired with the Informant to deliver 
cocaine from California to Detroit, Michigan.  Ruiz-Herrera, driving a black Saturn, 
escorted the Informant, who drove his tractor-trailer, to a location under an over-pass in 
Wilmington, California.  There, Ruiz-Herrera directed the loading of cocaine into the 
Informant’s tractor-trailer and instructed the Informant to proceed to Detroit.  Authorities 
later stopped the tractor-trailer and seized 64 kilograms of cocaine. 
Following a jury trial, Ruiz-Herrera was found guilty on one count of conspiracy 
to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and one 
count of possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).  The statutory sentencing range for these violations is ten 
years to life imprisonment.  The base offense level is 38, which, combined with Ruiz-
Herrera’s criminal history category of I, results in a sentencing guidelines range of 235-
293 months.  At the sentencing hearing, and over Ruiz-Herrera’s objection, the District 
Court found that Ruiz-Herrera was a “manager” of the criminal conspiracy, increasing his 
base offense level to 41, which resulted in a sentencing guidelines range of 324-405 
months.  After considering all relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the 
District Court sentenced Ruiz-Herrera to 360 months imprisonment.  Ruiz-Herrera 
appealed.1
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s factual determination for 
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II. Discussion 
Appellant argues that, under Apprendi, the determination as to whether he was a 
“manager” for sentencing purposes should have been made by a jury and not the 
sentencing court.   
In Apprendi, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm 
for unlawful purposes, which carried a prison term of five to ten years.  But the trial court 
found that Apprendi’s conduct violated New Jersey’s “hate crime” law because it was 
racially motivated, and, accordingly, imposed a 12-year sentence, two years more than 
the maximum allowed under the firearm statute.  The Supreme Court reasoned that this 
violated Apprendi’s right to a jury trial, and held that, “[o]ther than the fact of prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond that prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.   
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-68 (2005), the Supreme Court 
applied Apprendi’s holding to the federal sentencing guidelines and held that the 
sentencing guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, and that courts are to consider them 
and other factors in 10 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in selecting an appropriate sentence.  Id.  In 
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 565 (3d Cir. 2007), this Court made it clear that, 
after Booke, a sentencing judge may make factual findings pertinent to considering the 
                                                                                                                                                  
clear error and de novo application of the law to the facts.  United States v. Lafferty, 503 
F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2007).  
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advisory guidelines, and must make such findings under a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.   
In this case, the statutory maximum for the violations is life imprisonment.  Under 
Grier, the District Court made a factual finding concerning Ruiz-Herrera’s role as a 
“manager,” which did result in a higher guideline range.  Nevertheless, the court imposed 
a sentence of 360 months imprisonment, a sentence within the statutory maximum of life 
imprisonment.  Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that the District Court viewed the 
guidelines as anything other than advisory and the record reflects that the District Court’s 
finding of Ruiz-Herrera as “manager” is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Consequently, the District Court did not violate Apprendi.  
Because the District Court did not violate Apprendi in determining that Ruiz-
Herrera was a “manager,” the court’s application of the three-level enhancement under 
U.S.S.G § 3B1.1(b), and its denial of the safety valve provision of the U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 
was not erroneous.2
III. Conclusion  
  Finally, we are satisfied that the District Court properly considered 
the appropriate factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).   
We conclude that the District Court did not violate Apprendi in finding Ruiz-
Herrera to be a “manager” under an advisory guideline range.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s sentence.     
                                              
2 The safety valve provision states that in the case of an offense under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 
846, the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with applicable guidelines below the 
statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds that the defendant meets the criteria in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5).  Based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4), a defendant is ineligible for 
the safety valve provision if the defendant is a “manager” or “supervisor” in the offense.   
